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T

o date, most warfare has taken place within what Robert J. Bunker terms
“human space,” meaning the traditional four-dimensional battlespace that
is discernible to the human senses.1 In essence, war has always consisted of
human beings running, dodging, and hurling things at each other, lately with the
help of machinery. Even such revolutionary developments as gunpowder only
enhanced our ability to throw things at enemies we could see and hear.
The first crude examples of autonomous weapons were probably the
early experiments by the US Navy and Sperry Gyroscope Company on unpiloted aircraft during the last years of the First World War. Then came the advent
of electronics, especially radar, and warfare began to leave the realm of human
senses. Ships and planes could fire on enemies that were no more than ghostly
green images on a cathode ray tube. Later came military robots such as cruise
missiles that were able to autonomously execute missions formerly requiring
manned systems. Advanced radar engagement systems enabled pilots to locate,
identify, and destroy enemy aircraft without ever seeing them. Some robotic
systems became even more independent, such as the Navy’s Phalanx close-in air
defense weapon, which is “capable of autonomously performing its own search,
detect, evaluation, track, engage, and kill assessment functions.”2 Thanks to
advanced sensors and information processing, target recognition and identification methods are being developed to permit truly autonomous guided munitions.
This includes munitions capable of autonomously engaging fixed and mobile
ground targets, as well as targets in air and space.3 Warfare has begun to leave
“human space.”
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A long step in this direction was taken in mid-2000 when the US Senate
Armed Services Committee added $246.3 million to its version of the 2001
defense authorization bill to speed development of unmanned combat systems.
The committee set two ambitious goals--within ten years, one third of all deepstrike aircraft would be unmanned; and within 15 years, one third of ground
combat vehicles would operate without human beings on board.4 At about the
same time, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the
US Army selected initial contractors for the Army’s planned Objective Force.
The concept calls for “a network-centric, distributed force that will include a
manned command and control element/personnel carrier, a robotic direct-fire
system, a robotic non-line of sight system, an all-weather robotic sensor system,
coupled with other layered sensors.”5 According to Lieutenant Colonel John
Blitch, program manager for DARPA’s Tactical Mobile Robotics Program, “We
have spent a lot of time and energy analyzing employment concepts for portable
robotic platforms over the last few years and are convinced of their revolutionary impact on dismounted warfare.”6 These initiatives and others are rapidly
taking us to a place where we may not want to go, but probably are unable to
avoid.
Once this progression of ever more capable machines began, the US
armed forces, and those of other advanced countries, started down a road that
will probably remove warfare almost entirely from human hands. Several
trends are contributing to this unsettling development, but the most important
one is the rise of computer-driven information systems coupled with the proliferation of mobile autonomous and semi-autonomous systems (i.e. “robots”).
The devices created by this coupling greatly increase the speed at which things
happen, especially weapon effects and information processing. A much less
noticed trend, the development of very cheap and very small military systems,
will also help to move warfare even further out of “human space.” In combination, these advances have a synergistic effect. More and more aspects of
warfighting are not only leaving the realm of human senses, but also crossing
outside the limits of human reaction times. The effect of these trends is already
being enhanced by the emergence of directed energy weapons (DEWs) with
their capacity for engagement at the speed of light.
In short, the military systems (including weapons) now on the horizon will
be too fast, too small, too numerous, and will create an environment too complex
for humans to direct. Furthermore, the proliferation of information-based
systems will produce a data overload that will make it difficult or impossible for
humans to directly intervene in decisionmaking. This is not a consideration for
the remote science-fiction future. Weapons and other military systems already
under development will function at increasingly higher levels of complexity and
responsibility--and increasingly without meaningful human intervention.
According to the US Army Infantry School, “We intend to transform
the Army, all components, into a standard design with internetted C4ISR.”7
And, it is well known that various “digital army” initiatives such as the Land
Warrior system and the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below are
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under way.8 Likewise, a number of unmanned and semi-autonomous systems
are already in wide use, and autonomous systems are in prototype or development.9 The first operational light-speed weapon, the US Air Force’s Yal-1a
Attack Laser (also known as ABL or Airborne Laser), is slated for operational
readiness by 2003. Others, such as high-power microwave and particle-beam
devices, are under development.10 At Sandia National Laboratories, tiny MEMS
(Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems) already exist in prototype form.11
None of this is accidental. For one thing, it is national policy, articulated
by former President Bill Clinton as a critical part of the national security strategy.12 Second, it has been pursued tenaciously by the military despite expense,
setbacks, and criticism. Knowledge is seen as the key to “battlefield dominance,”
and speed is seen as the key to exploiting that knowledge. We have made these
two qualities--knowledge (information) and speed--the keystones of planning
for the future Army and the other services as well. Army After Next (AAN)
forces are expected to need both “linear speed” (speed across the ground) and
“angular speed” (the ability to out-think and anticipate) in order to survive
and win on future battlefields.13 Like the chiefs of the other services, General
Eric Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff, has clearly stated that he endorses this
concept.14 It is believed that these qualities--information dominance, combined
with speed and agility--will lead to military dominance at all levels of warfare:
strategic, operational, and tactical.15
Military discussions of advanced warfighting (as opposed to scientific
or technical ones) occasionally include the reassurance that there will always
be an immediate, direct, and intimate connection between human beings and
warfighting. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The purpose of technology
is to equip the man. We must not fall prey to the mistaken notion technology can
reduce warfare to simply manning the equipment.”16 As a white paper from the
US Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) put it, “Autonomous
unmanned systems will be fully adaptive to unforeseen changes while remaining completely predictable in mission performance.”17
We are faced with the prospect of equipment that not only does not
require soldiers to operate it, but may be defeated if humans do attempt to exert
control in any direct way. It is easy to see a steadily decreasing role for humans
in direct combat as the 21st century progresses.

Information Systems
The fundamental development underlying the loss of human control is
that of automated information systems. Furthermore, the impressive current
capabilities of such systems may only hint at their future capacity. Quoting
again from the TRADOC white paper:
Advances in computer architecture and machine intelligence will
have reached the point where intelligent agents can analyze the environment and current battle situation, search likely target areas, detect
and analyze targets, assist in attack decisions, select and dispense
munitions, and report results. These unmanned systems will augment
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manned platforms in every facet of operations on the ground, sea,
air, and space, including information dominance and manipulation.18

The difference between a machine that can do all these things and
“assist in attack decisions” and one that makes its own “attack decisions” is
a matter of programming. This is a description of machines that can function
autonomously to conduct warfare at the tactical level. If anything, this description is probably a gross understatement.
Current computers have not even begun to approach their theoretical
limits, and those limits continue to recede. In 1998, scientists at the Los Alamos
National Laboratory in New Mexico announced that they had been able to consistently manipulate subatomic particles, thus opening to the way for computation
and communication systems orders of magnitude smaller and faster than the
ones now in existence.19 In 1999 researchers at UCLA and Hewlett-Packard succeeded in constructing microscopic integrated circuits using single molecules
as building blocks. James Heath, the UCLA professor leading the project, suggested that a molecular computer with the processing power of 100 conventional
personal computers would be about the size of a grain of salt. The implications
are almost unimaginable--cheap, ubiquitous supercomputing, and unlimited
memory capacity in devices so small that they are on the scale of insects.20
This is not to suggest that there will ever be an overriding decision to
exclude humans from decisionmaking. Instead, we will continue to pretend to
be in complete control while leading ourselves gradually and incrementally
toward systems whose logic demands that human control become more abstract
with less and less direct participation.

Mastering the OODA Loop
The entry point for automated systems to join the military decisionmaking process is described in abstract form by the so-called “OODA” Loop:
observe, orient, decide, and act.21 For purposes of this discussion, the loop
can be seen as beginning with “observation,” and indeed there will be a great
deal of observation connected with future military organizations.
An enormous amount of attention (and money) has been invested in
observation in the form of new surveillance and reconnaissance technology.
Development of these capabilities has become increasingly vital with the Army
Chief of Staff’s 1999 announcement that he plans to field units whose very
survival is largely dependent on information collection and advanced information systems.22 This meshes nicely with the TRADOC view of the future:
“The use of multiple, inexpensive unmanned platforms with modular sensor
and information-gathering devices provide for an almost unlimited ability
to analyze the battlespace. These sensor platforms will be land-based (both
mobile and stationary), airborne, and space-based.”23 As explained by Major
General John Thomas, commander of the US Army Intelligence Center at
Ft. Huachuca, Arizona, this kind of information saturation is essential. The
Army’s new lightly armored “medium brigades” will have intelligence and
sensor assets equivalent to those of a full division. These new brigades are
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expected to survive by using these assets to avoid the enemy, using superior
knowledge, terrain, and agility to remain out of enemy fields of fire. According
to General Thomas, “Probably the largest and most exciting area is in robotics
so that many of these sensors can be automatically emplaced and maybe even
autonomously emplaced.”24
But victory does not always go the commander with the best observation. It goes to the one that can best process observation into data, data into
information, information into orders, and then orders into action. The process
is continuous--the results of action are observed, starting the process all over
again. The individual functions involved have been enshrined in military jargon
as the OODA Loop mentioned above.25 The notion of mastering this process,
“getting inside the enemy’s decision loop” (i.e. execute the OODA process more
quickly than the enemy) is at the heart of the digital Army and the information
warfare concept.
By 2025, speed-of-light engagement will be a common feature of military conflict. Future architectures envision a new array of ground- and spacebased sensors, uninhabited combat aerial vehicles (UCAV), and missile defense
technologies that will take advantage of directed energy weapons. Air, sea,
land, and space forces will be both faster and more agile. Adversaries will take
advantage of these characteristics to operate faster than a defender can observe
the activity, orient himself, decide how to respond, and act on that decision.
The attacker thus places himself “inside” the defender’s OODA Loop, destroying an adversary’s ability to conduct an active defense.26
To master the OODA Loop in this demanding environment, military leaders are pushing hard for the technology to obtain and process more
information more rapidly. This push attempts to achieve the core capability
of information dominance, “the ability to collect, control, exploit, and defend
information while denying an adversary the ability to do the same.”27 From the
perspective of an Army organized around automated information systems, the
struggle to get inside the enemy decision loop is one of processing power, the
ability to move through the loop ever more rapidly.
When improved sensors are coupled with extensive communications
links and advanced data-processing, the result is an ever-increasing flow of
detailed information. Unfortunately, the explosion of available information
inevitably results in information overload and flawed decisionmaking. Human
beings commonly deal with this by ignoring much of the inflow, thus negating
the purpose of the information systems in the first place. Recent exercises reveal
an alarming number of unread messages because of information overload. As
the quantity of data rises, the difficulty of preparing and interpreting it for decisionmaking grows. Furthermore, more information, flowing more efficiently,
can easily give the commander conflicting perspectives of the battlespace. Soon
it becomes obvious that the slowest element in the process is the human decisionmaker. By reducing the human role, the entire system is enhanced.
Automated systems, using some form of artificial intelligence, may be
the solution to this difficulty. As an Air Force document asserts: “Unmanned
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systems will capitalize on artificial intelligence technology gains to be able to
assess operational and tactical situations and determine an appropriate course
of action. The key to the success of command and control is information. Some
of these systems will not only collect data but also have the ability to analyze
data and provide recommendations to the commander.”28 Operationally, the
difference between “providing” a recommendation and “acting” on a recommendation is merely a software tweak.
Automated systems can certainly reduce the pressure of information
saturation and eliminate conflicts, but at a price. Essentially, they do so by
creating a series of information “filters” that establish priorities and eliminate
marginal data, reconcile the remaining information conflicts, and present a
consensus picture of the situation. All of this is invisible to the ultimate consumer, out of his or her control and very likely not well understood. This means
that the commander is receiving a picture of the battlefield that is designed to
emphasize certain things while de-emphasizing others. Still other factors are
omitted entirely.

Autonomy
STAR 21, an Army study of 21st-century needs, concluded that unmanned systems will become prevalent on the land battlefield.29 The rise of
unmanned ground systems is the most important step toward autonomous
systems for land warfare, a rise that is already in full progress. As envisioned by
the Army Training and Doctrine Command:
Unmanned systems will operate throughout the depth, width, and
breadth of the battlespace, providing both the real-time intelligence
necessary for the commander to locate and identify key targets, as
well as the means to destroy them. . . . [A]utonomous convoys loaded
with the necessary supplies to replenish expenditures can be dispatched from ports or airheads to central logistics bases. From there,
the unmanned systems can transport the supplies further forward. . . .
Future battles will have unmanned systems as forward sensor/observers detecting and identifying high-value targets and calling for fires.30

Unmanned systems have been around for a long time in the form of
multimillion-dollar cruise missiles and the like. After all, the long-range cruise
missile is nothing more than an unmanned bomber, an autonomous aerial
vehicle or, simply put, a robot.31 But now such systems are cheaper, smaller,
and more capable than seemed possible even a few years ago. In 1998, for
example, an autonomous aircraft no bigger than a large model airplane and
weighing just 29 pounds flew across the Atlantic Ocean, successfully arriving at a predetermined destination.32 The US Department of Defense has an
extensive military robotics program, and by 2005 DOD is expected to spend
$72 million on unmanned ground vehicles alone.33 Unmanned systems have
supported the Bosnia mission in the areas of reconnaissance (with Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles) and mine-clearing using Standardized Robotic System kits on
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manned platforms.34The DARPA Unmanned Ground Vehicle Demo 11 program
has fielded four HMMWVs reconfigured as unmanned scout vehicles.35
The difference between a truly autonomous system and one that is
merely unmanned is another question of processing power. As mentioned
earlier, the coming micro-miniaturization of computer systems will eventually
make it possible to pack computing power greater than a year 2001 mainframe
system into a device that is barely visible.36 The immediate prospect is for cheap
computers small enough to be used in almost any device, followed at some
point in the more distant future by ubiquitous supercomputing and unlimited
memory capacity in devices that are literally microscopic. These developments
are important for their own sake, but also in the present context because they
set the stage for autonomy.
As the TRADOC white paper put it, “Unmanned systems may have
the ability to learn. The concept of collective leadership and subordination will
then permit systems working under human supervision to assist the warfighter
in the accomplishment of his mission.”37 As this quote suggests, TRADOC
publications in particular are careful to specify that human decisionmaking
will be involved at some level in the operation of these systems. However, there
is no a priori reason why this should be so. Inevitably, some adversary will
decide that eliminating humans from the military decision cycle at the tactical
level will confer a significant advantage, forcing others to follow suit.
The logic leading to fully autonomous systems seems inescapable.
Clearly, the armed forces will want a “person in the loop” no matter how capable
the automated system may become. However, if this person has a meaningful
role in the operation of the system (for example, a tank, fighting ship, or warplane), then he or she will obviously be the most critical (and probably the most
vulnerable) component of the system as well as the most difficult to replace. The
obvious course for an adversary attacking the tank, ship, or plane is to concentrate on attacking the human component. This probability creates serious design
restraints and restrictions in performance since protecting the human becomes
critically important and imposes a burden in armor, life support, sustainable
g-forces, and so forth. This provides a strong incentive not to include humans
in the systems at all.
The obvious response to this threat is that favored by the Air Force for
some applications, “fly-by-wire.” This means simply that a human located safely
away from the battle scene remotely pilots the aircraft by radio control. In principle, there is no reason this solution could not be applied to ground vehicles
and ships, or at least to surface vessels (submarines present a different problem).
Unfortunately this solution has its own vulnerabilities--the enemy’s priority
then becomes to attack the remote control links electromagnetically by jamming
or physically by attacking the transmitter.38 This becomes all the more troublesome when cross-continental control is required. Having extended links gives
the enemy a logical place to attack that is hard to defend. Systems will need at
least some measure of local autonomy in order to survive. Fully autonomous
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systems avoid all these difficulties while allowing a less vulnerable, higher
performance system.
But even if full autonomy is rejected, the presence of humans making
critical decisions still does not avoid the issue. Given that such persons have
a real, rather than merely symbolic, role in the command and control of the
fighting system, consideration must be given to the possibility that they will
be injured or killed and cannot carry out their duties. It seems unreasonable
that the highly trained crew and their multimillion-dollar ship or aircraft would
simply be written off as a casualty. It is far more sensible to design the system so
as to continue to operate the plane or vessel and, if necessary, continue the fight.
This is nothing more than autonomy arrived at by a slightly different route.
The trend toward reliance on automation and artificial intelligence
can be seen in the Navy’s Smart Ship Program, which is spending millions of
dollars to replace personnel with technology. By 2005, this program is expected
to reduce the number of sailors on the Navy’s 27 CG 47 Ticonderoga-class
cruisers by replacing them with new control, automation, damage control,
and information technologies. Shortly afterward, 57 of the DDG 51 Arleigh
Burke-class destroyers will be likewise refitted. According to Navy plans, the
crew of the new DD-21 “land attack” destroyers could number as few as 95.
Current destroyers and cruisers carry more than 300 sailors on board.39 These
improvements aren’t cheap. Refitting the 27 Ticonderoga-class cruisers alone
will cost $124 million. But according to a Navy assessment, lower manpower
costs, less maintenance, and fewer support costs will save nearly $3 million
a year per ship.40 Another example is the “arsenal ship” proposal in which a
stealthy, unmanned vessel would loiter off an enemy shore and fire guns or
missiles at the command of air or ground forces located elsewhere.41
In sum, this approach results in the development of systems that take
the operator “out of the loop,” shifting the role of the human operator from that
of an active controller to that of a supervisor who serves in a fail-safe capacity
in the event of system malfunction. Unfortunately, the role of passive monitor
seems to be a task for which humans are poorly suited.42

Speed
Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs), including laser, microwave, and
charged particle or neutral particle beam devices, are a major emerging military
technology that enormously increases the speed with which weapon effects
occur. All are based on the emission of electromagnetic energy at different
frequencies, usually in focused beams. They can be vastly more accurate than
conventional weapons because they follow line-of-sight rather than ballistic
trajectories, thus eliminating all the problems of ballistics.43 Researchers and
engineers are now developing a wide range of these devices.44 The first operational laser weapon, the US Air Force’s Yal-1a Attack Laser, will be followed
by Army and Navy systems. One of these, the Army’s Tactical High Energy
Laser Demonstrator, scored a first on 28 August 2000 by using a deployable
laser system to successfully track and destroy a salvo of two Katyusha artillery
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rockets in flight. Other applications are being examined through the Army’s
“virtual test bed” for vehicle-mounted directed energy weapons.45
One advantage of such weapons is that missing the target is less
important, since the system will be able to cycle quickly and fire off another
speed-of-light burst, this time having corrected its aim. With DEWs, active
countermeasures (dodging, throwing chaff, deploying decoys, returning fire)
become enormously more difficult and in many cases impossible. It is hard to
see many roles for humans in this kind of lightning duel. Human perceptions
and motor coordination skills are simply not capable of intervening usefully. Defense then relies on instantaneous, automated responses and passive
measures, of which the best are probably speed and size. Small, agile, very
fast-moving targets, other things being equal, are harder to detect and much
harder to hit.46 This will place a premium on micro-systems, to be discussed
later. The same qualities that make such systems harder to target and strike
also make them much more difficult to control in anything approaching human
“real-time.”47
As indicated by the Army’s tactical laser systems, DEWs are not
limited to strategic weapon systems.48 A variety of threats--short-range rockets
and artillery, UAVs, cruise missiles, pop-up helicopters--can appear quickly
and without warning. When a threat is not detected until late or its unmasked
time is short, there is no second chance. Countering these threats requires a
weapon that is fast, accurate, and close-in. On 22 April 1999, Boeing completed proof-of-concept testing of a new tactical high-energy chemical laser.
As described by Boeing, this technology “permits . . . highly mobile, selfcontained laser weapons with significant lethality at engagement ranges up to
10 km for ground-to-air defensive systems, and over 20 km for air-to-ground
or air-to-air systems.” The company’s plans include “complete weapon systems
in roll-on, roll-off installations for rotorcraft (V-22, CH-47), aircraft (AC-130),
and ground vehicles.” Boeing says that such a system could be ready in about
two years.49 With different sensors and fire control it also offers a unique ultraprecise strike capability for operations other than war, where pinpoint accuracy,
tactical stand-off, and no collateral damage are dominant considerations.50
Perhaps the extreme example of warfare outside “human space” is that
of “netwar”--electronic conflict within and among computer systems attacking the full spectrum of opposing military and civilian information systems
(including computer-controlled networks such as communications, logistics,
and transportation). By its nature, the speed of such conflict is limited only by
the speed of the electronic circuits in which it occurs. This is another example
of conflict that will quickly escalate out of human control due to its complexity and rapidity. Netwar attacks may be too pervasive and rapid for human
intervention, adapting instantly to responses. Both attack and defense will be
completely automated, because humans are far too slow to participate.51
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Smaller and Smaller
Small systems are highly desirable for military purposes, especially in
a force-projection Army. Smaller systems require less space, thus fewer airframes to transport, and they use less fuel in operation. They are more difficult
for the enemy to detect and, once detected, harder to hit. The viability of such
“small, smart, systems” was demonstrated on 11 January 1999, when Lockheed
Martin began DOD-sponsored flight tests on an aircraft with a wingspan of six
inches--about the size of an outstretched hand. The aircraft, which weighs only
three ounces, is one of the smallest man-made flying objects.52
It is (once again) the presence of micro-electronics that makes the difference between the Lockheed Martin device and an ordinary model airplane.
Miniaturized electronic circuits have revolutionized military electronics.
Similarly, the miniaturization of mechanical systems is expected to launch
another revolution. Military commanders will have very small, very smart
machines to more effectively collect target and damage assessment information
with reduced risk to personnel and decreased probability of discovery. Swarms
(hundreds or thousands) of miniature autonomous vehicles will be capable of
performing tasks that are difficult or impossible today, such as locating and
disabling land mines, detecting chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, and
verifying treaties.
During the 1990s, Sandia National Laboratories produced an early
example of a microsystem, the Miniature Autonomous Robotic Vehicle
(MARV). MARV is one cubic inch in size and is made primarily from commercial parts using ordinary machining techniques. Despite its small size,
it contains all its needed power, sensors, computers, and controls. MARV is
severely limited in its operation, but it is leading to even smaller autonomous
vehicles with greatly enhanced mobility, more intelligence, on-board navigation and communication, as well as the ability to act cooperatively with other
robots.53 Sandia is also developing technologies to rapidly machine, fixture, and
assemble Small Smart Machine devices, including automated assembly of parts
down to 100 microns in size.54
At the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), researchers have
devised much tinier robots, similar to ants, which exhibit certain limited aspects
of intelligence and differentiated specialization, such as avoiding shadows
and staying away from each other. They are cheap and easy to reprogram.
According to researchers, “Thirty-five years from now, analogous small, lethal,
sensing, emitting, flying, crawling, exploding, and thinking objects may make
the battlefield highly lethal.”55
Very small systems have several advantages. As noted earlier, it is
easier to quickly transport huge numbers of them, both sensors and fighting
systems. They also can be moved at speeds, accelerations, decelerations, and in
intricate maneuvers that human beings could never withstand. It is conceivable
to move enormous numbers of these devices at ballistic missile speeds, having
them in action half a world away in minutes. In such circumstances, operating
according to preset instructions may not provide the necessary flexibility in
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operation, and remote control is probably impractical. Once again, this leads
us back to autonomy.
The nature of small systems is such that they are more difficult to hit
with conventional projectile weapons due to their small size and large numbers.
This applies even to some DEWs, such as lasers. The logical countermeasure
for very small, smart systems deployed in large numbers is probably an energy
weapon with an area effect such as an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) device.
Once again this is likely to lead to the play and counterplay of extremely rapid
autonomous systems functioning far too quickly for human intervention.

Solutions
If the problem is how to maintain meaningful human control of autonomous warfighting systems, no good solution presents itself. One answer, of
course, is to simply accept a slower information-processing rate as the price of
keeping humans in the military decision business. The problem is that some
adversary will inevitably decide that the way to defeat the human-centric
systems is to attack it with systems that are not so limited.
A longer-range solution is to integrate humans and machines in a far
more intimate fashion. Once form of this concept is that of the Air Force’s
Information Integration Center (IIC). In this scheme, all-source information
collectors would transmit raw data to an IIC. Archival databases linked to the
center would be used for historical analyses to fill information gaps. The IIC,
housed in an integrated and interconnected constellation of “smart” satellites,
will analyze, correlate, fuse, and “deconflict” all relayed data. The refined data
would be relayed to human users through implanted microscopic chips, providing users with computer-generated mental visualizations. This would allow the
user to place himself or herself into the selected battlespace.56 It would avoid the
need for clumsy interfaces by making humans a part of the information system
in a way very similar to that in which the computers are connected. But, like “flyby-wire” systems, it does depend on broadcast information at radio frequencies,
raising the serious possibility of jamming or other forms of interference.
In the further future, the arrival of very advanced, microscopic information systems may allow extremely sophisticated data processing capacities
to be made an integral part of the human brain. However, assuming this proves
to be possible, such a step may raise objections from those who object on moral
and ethical grounds to blurring the distinction between humans and machines. It
also does not address the relative fragility of human beings in combat situations.

Conclusions
The evolution and adaptation of the systems and processes described
here are not as simple nor as straightforward as it might seem. The effective use
of such technologies will require rapid, effective, and close interaction between
many different systems. It will involve sophisticated command and control
links as well as a variety of technical means, including reconnaissance sensors,
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communication links, computers, display systems, and weapon platforms. This
kind of new and subtle interaction will require radical changes in the architecture and integration of these interconnected and widespread intelligence
absorbing, processing, and application systems. Right now, the architectures
for this kind of “system of systems” are barely in the developmental stages.
The actual achievement of solutions for the integration of such large, complex
systems will be a long process involving extensive experimentation. At least
another decade, probably two, will be required.
This leaves us in something like the position of monarchies witnessing
the democratic revolution at the beginning of the 19th century. Something profound and far-reaching is going on all around us, even within our own societies.
But the advisers, courtiers, and generals that surround the throne are at a loss
to determine what it means, much less what to do about it.
Humans may retain symbolic authority, but automated systems move
too fast and the factors involved are too complex for real human comprehension. When computers are designed and programmed by other computers, the
situation will be even further from anything humans can reasonably expect
to understand, much less intervene in successfully. At the same time, loud
denials can be expected from some quarters, angrily claiming that humans are
as much, if not more, in charge than ever. In a sense this will be true--the new
systems will enable people to accomplish far more in war and peace than was
even conceivable before their development, or, rather, is even conceivable now.
But the simple fact remains, the farther we extend our reach outside “human
space,” the more we require the assistance of machines.
Future generations may come to regard tactical warfare as properly
the business of machines and not appropriate for people at all. Humans may
retain control at the highest levels, making strategic decisions about where and
when to strike and, most important, the overall objectives of a conflict. But
even these will increasingly be informed by automated information systems.
Direct human participation in warfare is likely to be rare. Instead, the human
role will take other forms--strategic direction perhaps, or at the very extreme,
perhaps no more than the policy decision whether to enter hostilities or not.
Nevertheless, wars are a human phenomenon, arising from human needs for
human purposes. This makes intimate human participation at some level critical, or the entire exercise becomes pointless.
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